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This article seeks to examine what factors influenced  the Aznar government’s support of the 
US-led invasion of Iraq to understand the Spanish symbolic contribution to this operation as 
part of the Coalition of the Willing, a decision that appeared focused on the short-term 
benefits for Spain rather than the long-term benefits for Iraq or the international 
community. 
 
Traditional approaches to state behaviour tend to focus on states as the main actors, and on 
decisions as a means to establish why states behave the way they do, and why states decide 
to participate in international military operations. However, these approaches seem too 
superficial and fail to take into consideration domestic dynamics and political narratives 
employed to justify particular political decisions. A closer look at the political narratives 
reveals what factors appear to be influential in the decision-making process and help us 
understand what lies behind states’ support for and contribution to international military 
operations. 
 
The article concludes that in the months leading up to and following the Iraq crisis, it 
became very clear that the factors that appeared to influence the positions of political actors 
in Spain were different, and those that constituted the narratives of Aznar’s government 
were as much a response to the external environment as ideological factors. 
 
Today’s Western armed forces are less expected to fight a war to defend the 
national territory from an attack by the armed forces of another state and 
more required to participate in multinational campaigns with political 
objectives and strategies rather different from those of times past. 
Furthermore, today’s international relations take place in a complex social and 
political environment in which traditional perceptions about state behaviour 
and the international system are being challenged by new forms of 
socialisations, interdependence and international standards.  
 
Traditional approaches to state behaviour tend to focus on states as the main 
actors, and on decisions as a means to establish why states behave the way 
                                                 
 A version of this paper was given as a presentation at the ECPR 2nd Graduate Conference in 
Barcelona in August 2008. I would like to thank Salomé Berrocal and two anonymous 
reviewers for their helpful feedback. Part of the research for this paper was possible thanks to 
a grant from the Spanish Cooperation Program in conjunction with the Australian National 
University (Canberra) and a Postgraduate Overseas Research Experience Scholarship from 
the University of Melbourne. These grants allowed me to be a visiting student at the Instituto 
Universitario General Gutierrez Mellado in Madrid to whom I am eternally grateful for their 
help and support. 
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they do, and why states decide to participate in international military 
operations. However, these approaches seem too superficial and fail to take 
into consideration domestic dynamics and political narratives employed to 
justify particular political decisions. A closer look at these narratives can 
reveal what factors appear to be influential in the decision-making process 
and help understand what lies behind states’ support for and contribution to 
international military operations, rather than why states might make these 
decisions.  
 
Spain has been participating in such operations since 1989, and currently has 
troops participating in UN and EU operations in Africa and the 
Mediterranean, as well as in Afghanistan. The case of Iraq is worthy of 
analysis on its own for two reasons.1 First, the conservative government of the 
Popular Party in power at the time, and especially Prime Minister José María 
Aznar, defended its position in the face of unprecedented public and political 
opposition. Second, of all the operations the Aznar government became 
involved in during its governing period (1996-2004), the Iraq operation 
instigated a rhetoric that suggested the Government’s perceived national 
interests were conflated with a party vision, and the extent to which Aznar 
viewed a potential contribution as an opportunity to correct historical wrongs 
in the development of Spain’s international place. The Spanish case 
demonstrates that domestic considerations, and historical events, not only 
continue to inform political narratives but contribute to the construction of 
state and political identities.2
 
 A third reason, and one not necessarily 
inconsistent with other operations, is the extent to which the Aznar 
government sought to convince Spain that the invasion was, in fact, legal as an 
attempt to justify its legitimacy. This is interesting because it raises questions 
about the impact that international law and international regulatory 
mechanisms have on the development of constraints or new normative 
frameworks in which states perceive themselves to be acting.  
The purpose of this article is to examine what factors appeared influential in 
the Aznar government’s support of the US-led invasion of Iraq so as to 
understand Spain’s symbolic contribution to this operation as part of the 
Coalition of the Willing, a decision that appeared focused on the short-term 
benefits for Spain rather than the long-term benefits for Iraq or the 
international community. This will be done by illustrating the different 
political narratives resulting from the dramatic shift in focus in Spanish 
foreign policy that took place in the period between the election of Aznar’s 
conservative party and his government’s decision to support the US-led 
invasion of Iraq in 2003.  It is argued here that the events that took place 
during this period demonstrate how political narratives can reveal that 
conceptualisations of security and national role perceptions can vary within 
the same country.  
 
                                                 
1 The Iraq case study is part of a broader research project that compares political rhetoric in 
four military operations currently being undertaken at the University of Melbourne. 
2 Various other examples come to mind; the political situation in Zimbabwe under Mugabe, 
the complexity of politics and identity in Africa generally, the various interpretations of 
Australian identity and the so-called History Wars, the formation of ethnicities and nationalist 




Analysing the Spanish decision 
 
There are a number of ways in which Spain’s decisions to support and 
participate in Operation Iraqi Freedom can be interpreted. The three most 
obvious options lie in the field of International Relations (IR), and they are 
also the most prominent within this field: Realism, Constructivism and 
Liberalism. Through a Realist lens we would understand Spain’s decisions to 
be rooted in the national interest, or in violation of it: for Realists, states 
should not participate in international missions that do not directly serve the 
national interest (for example humanitarian interventions) because their 
governments do not have the moral right to risk the lives of their armed 
forces, and states only have duties to their own citizens.3 In addition, the 
practice of ‘humanitarian’ intervention can be abused by states. Therefore, 
states should only participate in missions affecting their direct national 
interests, which are in turn defined in geostrategic or economic terms, fixed in 
time and space, and objectively and rationally articulated.4 The Constructivist 
lens would indicate that states’ actions are a response to the development of a 
new international normative framework in which the utility of force and 
perceptions of the national interest have changed over time and across states. 
Finnemore contended that the main argument to explain why states decide to 
intervene militarily is that which maintains that military intervention serves a 
functional purpose, versus normative arguments that contend that military 
intervention can in fact be viewed as a legitimate or right option. 
Constructivists focus on the latter argument, analysing language and decisions 
as a reflection of identity and of how the normative framework in which states 
perceive to be acting is changing and affecting decision-making.5
                                                 
3 N. Wheeler and A. Bellamy, ‘Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics’ in J. Baylis and S. 
Smith (eds.), The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 
Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 32. 
 The Liberal 
4 While it is acknowledged that there are differences within Realism, such as the role of the 
intrinsic violence of human nature, the role that domestic politics play in decision making, 
and states’ need to pursue absolute or relative gains, all branches share the same ontology and 
epistemology, they all agree on the anarchical nature of the international system and on the 
imperative to pursue the national interest as a means to survive. They also agree that morality 
plays no role in politics and the international relations is a struggle for power. For a sample of 
this literature see for example some of Realism’s keys proponents and commentators H. Bull, 
The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1977; E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of 
International Relations, London: Macmillan, 1939; C. A. J. Coady, ‘Intervention, Political 
Realism and the Ideal of Peace’ in C. A. J. Coady and M. O'Keefe (eds.), Righteous Violence: 
The Ethics and Politics of Military Intervention, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 
2005, pp. 14-31; J. Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold 
War’, International Security Vol. 15, No. 1, 1990, pp. 5-56; J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of 
Great Power Politics, New York & London: W. W. Norton, 2001; H. Morgenthau, Politics 
among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, K. W. Thompson and W. D. Clinton 
(eds.), 7th ed. Boston: McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2006 [1948]; G. Rose, ‘Review Article: 
Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy’, World Politics Vol. 51, No.1, 1998, pp. 
144-172; S. Walt, ‘International Relations: One World, Many Theories’, Foreign Policy Vol. 
110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge, 1998; K. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A 
Theoretical Analysis, New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. 
5 Constructivism is a relatively new and still evolving approach to the study of International 
Relations. Constructivists do not share the same ontology or epistemology that Realism and 
Liberalism do (although some would go as far as arguing that Realism and Constructivism in 
fact do share, or at least complement each other’s ontology, see for example J. Sterling-Folker, 
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lens would provide an image of cooperation and regulation. Liberalism 
believes in the progressive improvement of human beings and their ability to 
change for the better. This ability is reinforced by democracy and institutional 
mechanisms to promote cooperation and economic interdependence, which 
lead to the spread of democratic values and the subsequent regulation and 
elimination of war and conflict.6
 
 
It is acknowledged that the above theories serve a functional role in the study 
of international politics, and they are all equally useful in explaining some 
state decisions. However, the shortcomings of the above approaches lie in 
their attempts to explain why states behave the way they do, and aim to use 
this knowledge to predict future behaviour as a mechanism to regulate or 
mitigate armed conflict. IR theories understand states as actors with agency 
and often are less interested with the domestic tensions and narratives that 
emerge around decisions to contribute armed forces, focusing mainly on the 
final decision; the state remains the main unit of analysis. They furthermore 
tend to understand decisions as reactions to the external environment, at 
times influenced by identity or domestic politics, but conditioned by external 
factors. While the external environment plays a big role in decisions, it is 
argued that it is not perceived equally by all actors involved in decision-
making at a domestic level, nor are normative ideas or frameworks 
                                                                                                                                            
‘Realism and the Constructivist Challenge: Rejecting, Reconstructing, or Rereading’, 
International Studies Review, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2002, pp. 73-97. Constructivists disagree that 
state’s interests and attitudes are fixed and based on individualistic and materialistic 
principles that condemn them to set behavioural patterns. Instead states undergo a cognitive 
dynamic in which they form identities, which are shaped first, by their historical past, and 
second, by the process of interaction itself. Therefore they are sceptical of claims to objectivity 
and rationality in decision-making. See for example M. Finnemore, ‘Constructing Norms of 
Humanitarian Intervention’ in P. J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: 
Norms and Identity in World Politics, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, pp. 153-
185; M. Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention. Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force, 
Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 2003; M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink, ‘Taking 
Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative 
Politics’, Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 4, 2001, pp. 391-416; P. Katzenstein, The 
Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996; A. Wendt, ‘Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction 
of Power Politics’, International Organization Vol. 46, No. 2, 1992, pp. 391-425; and A. 
Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999. 
6 Much like Realism, within Liberalism there are different approaches such as Democratic 
Peace Theory and Institutional Liberalism or Neo-Liberalism that provide different 
arguments, but Liberals in general also agree on the role of power in international behaviour. 
Furthermore, Liberals do not believe that the problem of bad or violent behaviour is rooted in 
human nature but in the structures and institutions that set the rules and parameters in which 
interdependence and cooperation take place.  Although they see the individual as the object, 
leading to a shift from thinking of military security to economic and social welfare, they 
continue to view the state as the main actor in international politics, acting in an anarchical 
system. See for example M. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and 
Socialism, 1st ed. New York: Norton, 1997; F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last 
Man, New York: Free Press, 1992; S. Hoffmann, ‘The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism’, 
Foreign Policy No. 98, 1995, pp. 159-177; R. Keohane, ‘International Institutions: Can 
Interdependence Work?’, Foreign Policy, No. 110, 1998, pp. 82-96; C. Layne, ‘Kant or Cant: 
The Myth of the Democratic Peace’, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1994, pp. 5-49; 




understood equally, nor do all domestic actors perceive the state equally in 
terms of the role it is to play internationally.  
 
For this reason this article turns to Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) with the 
objective of increasing the depth of the analysis and understand less why 
Spain participated but what factors appeared influential to the Spanish 
position. FPA is more concerned with the impact that domestic institutions, 
public opinion, psychological factors of leaders, national role conceptions, etc. 
have in the process of decision-making. Thus, any of the main IR theories can 
be used to carry out FPA and this has helped answer many questions that 
mainstream theories failed to address.7
 
 Despite FPA’s emphasis on 
quantitative and comparative approaches, it is flexible enough to allow for 
different methodological approaches to answer different questions. 
Hence, in adopting a Foreign Policy Analysis this article does not focus on the 
decision itself but on a qualitative examination of the process of justifying or 
contesting a particular policy position and the discourse employed in 
articulating justifications by the main government and opposition officials 
(mainly the President of the Government, Minister for Defence and Minister 
for Foreign Affairs and their equivalents in the main party of the opposition). 
This discourse is not necessarily understood to be a reflection or articulation 
of motivations; it is well known that politicians are not known for their 
transparency or sincerity, especially when decisions involving security issues 
are concerned. However, it is argued that the choice of rhetoric and the 
framing of the crisis served a particular purpose and therefore this choice 
offers an opportunity to understand what factors contributed to the decision 
to support the US-led action, factors specific to Spain and to the Spanish 
domestic context. Public narratives and rhetoric are considered a reflection of 
the political process regardless of the differing views that individuals might 
hold within the parties, which is why top officials form the core of the 
research, as they are charged with publicly defending their party’s official 
policy positions and decisions. 
 
                                                 
7 For a comprehensive overview of the development of this field see V. Hudson, ‘Foreign 
Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations’, Foreign 
Policy Analysis, No. 1, 2005, pp. 1-30; V. Hudson and C. Vore, ‘Foreign Policy Analysis 
Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow’, Mershon International Studies Review, No. 39, 1995, pp. 
209-238; R. Kuperman, ‘A Dynamic Framework for Analyzing Foreign Policy Decision 
Making’, International Studies Review, No. 8, 2006, pp. 537-554; S. Smith, ‘Describing & 
Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior’, Polity, Vol. 17, No. 3, 1985, pp. 595-607. See also some of 
the approaches used in I. Gallhofer and W. Saris, Foreign Policy Decision Making. A 
Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis of Political Argumentation, Westport, Connecticut & 
London: Praeger, 1996; K. J. Holsti, ‘National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy’ 
in S. G. Walker (ed.), Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis, Durham [N.C.]: Duke 
University Press, 1987, pp. 4-43; D. P. Houghton, ‘Reinvigorating the Study of Foreign Policy 
Decision Making: Toward a Constructivist Approach’, Foreign Policy Analysis, No. 3, 2007, 
pp. 24-45; Katzenstein, op. cit.; R. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and B. Sapin, ‘The Decision-Making 
Approach to the Study of International Politics’ in J. N. Rosenau (ed.), International Politics 
and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory, New York: Free Press, 1969, pp. 199-
206; N. B. Wish, ‘Foreign Policy Makers and Their National Role Conceptions’, International 
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 4, 1980, pp. 532-554. 
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Spain and the invasion of Iraq 
 
The participation of Spanish troops in the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq has 
been the most controversial decision since the country begun participating in 
international operations in 1989. The majority of Spanish society and political 
groups opposed not only the PP’s decision to participate, but the role the 
Spanish government played as the events leading to the invasion played out 
amidst worldwide protest and sharp divisions within the EU.8 Spain 
contributed a maximum of 1,300 troops in total to Operation Iraqi Freedom 
and this contribution was first, during the actual war, and then in the 
reconstruction process once the UN recognised the coalition.9
 
 
Spain went to Iraq in defence of international law, or at least the Government 
was convinced of this fact.10 The rhetoric employed was very similar to that 
used by the Bush administration and the British government, but was also 
very much conditioned by the domestic political environment. Thus, while 
Aznar, Bush and Blair might have shared some of their perceptions about why 
a military response was the only option to achieve their political goals, Aznar’s 
plans were conditioned by his own ideas about the role Spain should play in 
addition to substantial domestic opposition to the war and his inability to 
convince Spaniards.11 All opposition groups in Parliament disagreed with the 
use of force, did not believe there was enough proof to justify a military attack, 




In the Spanish government’s narratives leading up to the invasion, Saddam 
was guilty; he had WMDs, was willing to use them and presented a clear 
threat, and had links to terrorist groups and could supply them with WMDs.13
                                                 
8 These divisions were even described by Donald Rumsfeld as reflecting of the existence of an 
Old Europe and a New Europe, see for example BBC, Outrage at 'old Europe' remarks, 23 
January 2003, available at: <www.bbc.co.uk>. 
 
According to the Spanish Government, the international community had been 
trying since 1991 to ensure Iraq’s disarmament and just as the use of force was 
justified and appropriate then, the use of force was again required in 2003: 
the situation was the same and it was the only way to make Saddam comply. 
9 The UN Security Council authorised Resolution 1483 in May 2003 approving the formation 
of a stability and security force. The Consejo de Ministros on 25 April announced a change in 
the composition of the Spanish contingent to be included in a Multinational Security Force. 
10 See even for example the memoirs of I. Arias, Confesiones De Un Diplomático. Del 11-S Al 
11-M (Barcelona: Planeta, 2006), a diplomat who also represented Spain at the UNSC during 
the crisis. 
11 Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Barómetro De Opinión Pública. Estudio No. 2481, 
CIS, February 2003, available at: <www.cis.es>.  
12 This was obvious in all parliamentary debates, but see for example Congreso de los 
Diputados, Pleno Y Diputación Permanente Año 2003 VII Legislatura Número 222. Sesión 
Plenaria Número 213 Celebrada El Miércoles, 5 De Febrero De 2003, 5 February 2003, 
available at: <www.congreso.es>. 
13 This was mainly based on the evidence that was being produced by the US and Britain. The 
Government never spoke of having its own evidence but quoted US and British government 
officials as well as previous UN Resolutions and reports to back up its case. This conclusion is 
confirmed by Pizarroso, who conceded that Aznar never produced reports from Spanish 
intelligence services in A. Pizarroso Quintero, Nuevas Guerras, Vieja Propaganda (De 




In the Government’s view, Saddam had violated numerous UNSC resolutions 
over the past twelve years and had shown little or no intention to cooperate 
with the international community despite the many opportunities he had been 
given. Furthermore, the international community was legally authorised to act 
by virtue of past UNSC resolutions (including those that authorised the use of 
force) and to stop Saddam’s repeated flagrant violations of international law. 
In the Government’s view, if international law was not protected and Saddam 
was allowed to govern and act with impunity, it would set a bad precedent to 
other tyrants around the world; international law must be defended and an 
example set. This narrative was repeatedly used by Aznar in Parliament, and 
by Ana Palacio, Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the UN Security Council.14
 
 
Of course there was also mention of the international terrorist threat and the 
Spanish government’s narratives often mirrored those employed by the US. 
For example, then Secretary of State Colin Powell said that inspectors were 
not ‘detectives’ and their job was not to look for nor find the weapons.15 Aznar 
repeated the same statement: ‘The inspectors are not detectives; the 
inspectors must act like auditors that document the elimination of the 
weapons of mass destruction that we know Iraq has’ and ‘It is Saddam 
Hussein who has to give up his weapons, rather than the inspectors find them’ 
repeatedly emphasising Saddam’s guilt.16 The Spanish government borrowed 
much of its discourse from the justifications being offered by British Prime 
Minister Blair and the Bush administration. But the fact that any military 
action would be considered legal and legitimate was not the only justification, 
and Aznar appeared influenced by other factors in his position.17 These factors 
were more related to the past, ideology and a break with traditional foreign 
policy goals to pursue a different vision of the role that Spain should play in 
the international arena and within the Euro-Atlantic area.18
                                                 
14 See for example Anuarios de Política Exterior, ‘Intervención De La Ministra De Asuntos 
Exteriores, Ana Palacio Vallelersundi, Ante El Consejo De Seguridad De Naciones Unidas’, 
Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación, MAEC, 7 March 2003; Anuarios de Política 
Exterior, ‘Intervención De La Ministra De Asuntos Exteriores, Ana Palacio Vallelersundi, En 
El Consejo De Seguridad De Naciones Unidas Sobre Irak’, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y 
Cooperación, MAEC, 14 February 2003. 
 
15 United Nations, Security Council 4701st Meeting S/Pv.4701, 5 February 2003 [cited 5 June 
2009]; available at: <www.un.org>. 
16 Aznar even stated on 5 February that Saddam had sought to enrich uranium and the 
international community had been powerless to stop him, see Congreso de los Diputados, 
Pleno Y Diputación Permanente Año 2003 VII Legislatura Número 222. Sesión Plenaria 
Número 213 Celebrada El Miércoles, 5 De Febrero De 2003, 5 February 2003, available at: 
<www.congreso.es>.  
17 This is, unsurprisingly, a contested issue. See for example C. de Castro Sánchez, ‘Las 
Acciones Armadas Por Razones Humanitarias ¿Hacia Una Injerencia Humanitaria? Una 
Aproximación Teórico-Práctica’ Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa, 2003; R. Fawn, ‘The Iraq 
War: Unfolding and Unfinished’ in R. Fawn and R. A. Hinnebusch (eds.), The Iraq War: 
Causes and Consequences, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006, pp. 1-18; J. 
Howorth, ‘France: Defender of International Legitimacy’ in R. Fawn and R. A. Hinnebusch 
(eds.), The Iraq War: Causes and Consequences, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2006, pp. 49-59; R. Thakur, The United Nations, Peace and Security, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
18 R. Gillespie, ‘Spanish Foreign Policy: Party Alternatives or the Pursuit of Consensus?’, 
Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2007, pp. 29-45; C. Skola, 
‘Spanish Foreign Policy and the Impact of Ideological Change’, Perspectives on Business & 
Economics. Modern Spain emerges, No. 23, 2005, pp. 55-64; and P. Woodworth, ‘Spain 
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Aznar and Spanish foreign policy 
 
While Spain’s regions of focus have traditionally been Europe, Latin America, 
the Mediterranean and North Africa, the PP government privileged an 
unconditional relationship with the US over Spain’s long-established interests, 
as was already manifested in Aznar’s support and contribution of troops in 
Kosovo and Afghanistan. From the moment Aznar came to power, he sought 
to re-establish Spain’s international position, and increase its influence, even 
if that meant breaking the existing consensus forged in Spain during the 
democratic transition and the governments of the PSOE from 1982 to 1996.19
 
  
The policies of the PP, headed by Aznar from 1996 until 2004, personified a 
shift towards the universalisation of Western (or US) values with a neoliberal 
approach to economic policy and what seemed like a realist approach to 
security that entailed a return to the Atlanticism that characterised Western 
security attitudes during the Cold War.20 Some argued that Aznar pursued the 
nationalisation of Spanish security, frustrated with the government’s inability 
to promote Spain beyond its middle power status within the EU, limited by big 
powers, Britain, France and Germany.21 But arguably, a deterioration of 
relations with Morocco was attributed largely to Aznar,22 there was a decrease 
in defence spending in relation to Spain’s GDP during both his governments,23 
the domestic fight against terrorism continued to rely heavily on relations with 
France, and aid and development budgets decreased between 1996 and 
2004,24
 
 which raises questions about the extent of such nationalisation 
beyond mere rhetoric. 
Despite this, there were changes. While the PP appeared to move to the 
political centre in search of votes during political campaigns, it made a 
dramatic return to the political right following its absolute majority in 
Parliament in 2000.25
                                                                                                                                            
Changes Course. Aznar's Legacy, Zapatero's Prospects’, World Policy Journal XXI, No. 2, 
2004, pp. 7-26.  
 González Bustelo argued that from 2000, the PP’s 
majority was characterised by authoritarian governance, paying no attention 
19 Gillespie, op. cit.; Woodworth, op. cit. 
20 See for example C. del Arenal, ‘Consenso Y Disenso En La Política Exterior De España’ Real 
Instituto Elcano Documento de Trabajo No. 25/2008 (2008); P. Heywood, ‘Desperately 
Seeking Influence: Spain and the War in Iraq’, EPS Vol. 3, No. 1, 2003, pp. 35-40: J -C 
Jiménez Redondo, De Suárez a Rodríguez Zapatero, La Política Exterior De La España 
Democrática, Madrid: Dilex S.L., 2006. 
21 Woodworth, op. cit., p. 13. 
22 R. Gillespie, ‘Between Ambition and Insecurity: Spanish Politics and the Mediterranean’ in 
S. Balfour (ed.), The Politics of Contemporary Spain, London & New York: Routledge, 2005, 
pp. 198-214. 
23 F. Perez Muinelo, El Presupuesto De Defensa En Espana: 1946-2006, Madrid: Ministerio 
de Defensa, 2006. 




25 S. Balfour, ‘The Reinvention of Spanish Conservatism. The Popular Party since 1989’ in S. 
Balfour (ed.), The Politics of Contemporary Spain, Oxon, UK & New York: Routledge, 2006, 




to public opinion and launching vicious discrediting campaigns against 
anyone with opposing ideas.26 Spanish participation in Kosovo and 
Afghanistan was decided without prior consultation with Parliament, and 
understood as another way in which Aznar demonstrated his desire to look 
towards the US.27 Spain during Aznar’s second administration (2000-2004) 
witnessed the most severe distancing of traditional foreign policy focus since 
the country’s democratic transition, and was characterised by Aznar’s 
unconditional support of the US international strategy after the events of 
September 2001.28 As Gillespie noted, the events of 9/11 led Aznar to ‘see new 
opportunities for Spain in an enhanced alignment with Washington, even at 
the expense of European unity’.29 Not only did this shift lack the support of 
most other political parties in Spain, but also Spanish public opinion.30 Del 
Arenal argued that Aznar’s foreign and security policy abandoned 
multilateralism and the primacy of international law in favour of unilateralism 
and a relationship of convenience with international legal standards.31 This 
climate culminated in the decision to send troops to Iraq and the discourse 




Aznar’s PP rhetoric often implied the existence of a binary ideologically 
divided world: liberal democracies vs. non-democracies. This rhetoric had 
already been used in the lead up to decisions to support the sending of troops 
to Kosovo (1999) and Afghanistan (2002) and in the Iraq case, good and evil 
remained the same (the democracies that espouse fair principles and values 
and have the moral responsibility to defend these values around the world 
versus tyrants, dictators, terrorists) but this time in addition evil had no rights 
(unlike democracies, which did). That is, the world had a right to expect 
Saddam to respect legality and a right to security,33
                                                 
26 M. González Bustelo, ‘Terrorismo Y Democracia: España Y Los Atentados Del 11-M’ Madrid: 
Centro de Investigación para la Paz, 2005. 
 but Iraq did not enjoy the 
same right for the international community to respect legality and the right of 
Iraqis to security. This rhetoric, and Aznar’s views of the role of the US in the 
27 This conclusion is part of my dissertation at the University of Melbourne. 
28 Del Arenal, ‘Consenso Y Disenso En La Política Exterior De España’, op. cit. 
29 Gillespie, ‘Spanish Foreign Policy: Party Alternatives or the Pursuit of Consensus?’, op. cit., 
p. 32. 
30 See for example Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Barómetro De Opinión Pública. 
Estudio No. 2481. 
31 Del Arenal, ‘Consenso Y Disenso En La Política Exterior De España’, op. cit. 
32 González Bustelo, op. cit. Despite the literature consulted, it must be noted that Spain has 
traditionally been notorious for the lack of critical analyses and while there exists some 
literature that evaluates the Aznar period, at times attempts at self-reflection focus on telling a 
particular version of the story and carry out ‘light’ assessments. This paper was considered too 
problematic for publication in Spain and I was instructed to elaborate on the theory part but 
discard the Spanish case study or replace it with an Australian case study. It is not unusual to 
find such critical commentators publishing outside of Spain, see for example C. Navajas 
Zubeldia, ‘From the 'War on Terror' to the Terror War: Spanish Defense Policy after 9/11’ in 
G. Kümmel, G. Caforio, and C. Dandeker (eds.), Armed Forces, Soldiers and Civil-Military 
Relations, VS verlag, 2009, pp. 231-244; C. Navajas Zubeldia, ‘The Spanish Defense Policy in 
Regression’ in K. Haltiner, P. Klein, and F. Kernic (eds.), The European Armed Forces in 
Transition: A Comparative Analysis, New York: Peter Lang, 2005, pp. 91-128. 
33 See for example Congreso de los Diputados, Pleno Y Diputación Permanente Año 2003 VII 
Legislatura Número 225. Sesión Plenaria Número 216 Celebrada El Miércoles, 12 De 
Febrero De 2003, 12 February 2003, available at: <www.congreso.es>.  
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Aznar would later admit being disappointed with the development of the 
European security architecture. He argued that with the end of the Cold War 
and the emergence of the US as the world’s sole superpower, Europeans made 
the grave mistake of believing that all threats were over and decided to ‘lower 
their guard and disarm’.35 This, he maintained, increased the gap in terms of 
technology and capabilities to guarantee security, as the US followed the 
opposite judgement, to the detriment of the European countries.36 For Aznar, 
with the fall of the Berlin Wall, other threats materialised: international 
terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and 
what he called ‘States without principles’, as well as Islamic fundamentalism.37 
Further, Aznar deemed Europe incapable of carrying out the work the US 
must do, due to a lack of consensus and capabilities, as was exemplified with 
the crisis in the Balkans.38 He contrasted Europe’s oblivion to the realities of 
global security with Spain’s experience with dealing with the challenges of 
terrorism.39 The arrogant tone in which Aznar expressed these judgements 
suggests his discontent with the EU’s security architecture and the dominance 
of France and Germany over decision-making. In this sense, Woodworth 
conceded that Aznar perceived Spain as constrained in its decision-making by 
Paris, thus a shift towards Washington with the support from London, Rome 
and Poland would, in Aznar’s eyes, reposition the country closer to its rightful 
place in global politics.40
 
 However, as has been pointed out, this had not 
translated into increased defence spending, which raises questions about the 
type of international security structure he envisaged, other than enhancing the 
role of the US. 
Aznar’s perceived security environment was also strikingly similar to the 
environment described in the Bush Doctrine.41
                                                 
34 GEES, Qué Piensan Los ‘Neocon’ Españoles, Madrid: Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos, 2007. 
There are very few people who would dare make this claim in Spain, but there is little doubt 
that Aznar was influenced by this ideology and this is obvious not only in his policies but also 
in his institutional affiliations both in Spain and the US. 
 Aznar claimed, in an attempt 
to further justify the Bush Administration’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003 
pre-emptively, that the best attitude should be to take action before an attack 
takes place, such is the nature of the security environment in his view, and the 
legality of international action must take this into account. Further, he noted 
‘You cannot tell a country to do nothing, knowing that others are working 
towards attacking it and weakening it’ since ‘These are the rules of the modern 
35 J. María Aznar, Ocho Años De Gobierno. Una Visión Personal De España, 3 ed. Barcelona: 
Planeta, 2004, p. 148. 
36 Ibid.  149. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid.  176. 
39 Ibid.  185-86. 
40 Woodworth, op. cit., p. 19. 
41 White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington: 




world’.42 Another similarity between Aznar’s security policy and the Bush 
Doctrine rests on Aznar’s emphasis on the importance of recovering the 
‘national conscience’, without which there is no commitment to defence and 
security.43 Thus, Spain in Iraq was not defending the US; it was defending 
western democracies, especially the Spanish democracy.44
 
  
The role of Spain and the invasion of Iraq 
 
However, while in power and without the benefit of hindsight, Aznar resorted 
to the history of Spain to justify his Government’s position. His emphasis on 
enhancing Spain’s role in the world resembled at times the political rhetoric of 
Franco’s political project in which the dictator sought to restore the glory of 
Spain, profoundly disappointed with the loss of the last colonial remnants in 
Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines in 1898, and the decline of Spain as a 
Great Power in the world.45 This was illustrated in a number of narratives that 
emerged as the possibility of a military intervention became clearer. On 3 
March 2003, in the lead up to the US-led invasion of Iraq, Aznar was reported 
as saying that ‘Spain cannot remain sitting in the corner of History’, calling for 
a ‘responsible foreign policy avoiding joining ‘countries of no use’’.46 During a 
parliamentary debate two days later, the leader of the opposition, José Luís 
Rodríguez Zapatero, leader of the Socialist party (PSOE), responded by saying 
that Aznar ‘would not make History with this war’ and ‘Spaniards did not need 
to be taken out of a ‘corner’, as they came out by themselves peacefully 25 
years ago, ‘a dark corner, in which we were kept for four decades, the result, by 
the way, of a damn war’’.47 The previous day, the Spanish Congress had 
approved the PP’s proposal in a secret ballot, which supported the US and the 
UK in their decision to use force, if necessary, against Iraq to deal with 
Saddam Hussein’s alleged weapons of mass destruction. The approval was 
realised thanks to the advantage in numbers of the PP in Congress, resulting 
in 183 votes in favour (all from members of the PP) and 164 against.48
 
  
                                                 
42 Aznar, op. cit., p. 172, White House, op. cit., p. 15. Ironically, an assessment Saddam 
Hussein himself would have agreed with. Such is the ironic ethnocentrism of Aznar’s, and the 
West’s security policies. 
43 Aznar, op. cit., p.173, White House, op. cit., p. 3. 
44 Aznar rejected claims that US policy in Iraq was imperialistic and argued that the US in 
Iraq, together with Spain and other allies, was ‘articulating the possibility for the Iraqi people 
to be able to live a dignified and decent life in a democratic and liberty-based regime’ Aznar, 
op. cit., p. 173.  
45 The PP was created by a former Franco minister (Manuel Fraga) and it is no secret that 
many of Franco’s officials and supporters gravitated towards the PP during the democratic 
transition, therefore in terms of ideological bias, this is not surprising, but an allegation such 
as this remains taboo in Spain. For more on Franco’s rhetoric and his project for Spain see for 
example B. Crozier, Franco, Boston: Little Brown, 1967; P. Preston, Franco: A Biography, 
London: Harper Collins, 1993; J. Tusell, La Dictadura De Franco, Madrid: Alianza, 1988. For 
a discussion on the impact of ideology and the past on Spanish foreign policy see Skola, op. 
cit. 
46 El Pais, Aznar Asegura Que No Quiere Ver a España Alineada Junto ‘A Los Países Que No 
Sirven’, ElPais.com, 3 March 2003, available at: <www.elpais.com>.  
47 El Pais, Aznar Reitera Su Defensa De La Segunda Resolución Como Medio De Presión 
Contra Irak, ElPais.com, 5 March 2003. 
48 El Pais, El Congreso Aprueba La Proposición De Aznar Sobre Irak Con El Apoyo Unánime 
De Los Populares, ElPais.com, 4 March 2003. 
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During the parliamentary debate on 5 February 2003 that preceded the 
invasion of Iraq, Rodríguez Zapatero responded to Aznar’s various public 
references to the role that history played in his decision to support military 
action in Iraq on the side of the US. Rodríguez Zapatero claimed to have a 
different definition of history, one which does not ‘send the bill’ to politicians 
for their decisions: Aznar had lamented the inability of the League of Nations 
(and the leaders of its members) to stop the rise of Hitler and avoid the 
Second World War as a set of circumstances repeating themselves in Iraq49 to 
which Rodríguez Zapatero responded ‘…yours is an old conception of history. I 
share with many people another definition of history, that in which history 
refers to the men of the world as soon as they join together in society and 
work, fight and improve themselves’.50 Further, Rodríguez Zapatero argued 
that Spain was not in any ‘corner’ to be taken out of, as Aznar had alleged. In 
the narratives of the PSOE, Spain came out of a ‘corner of history’ with the end 
of the Franco dictatorship and the ensuing democratic transition,51
 
 while in 
the narratives of the PP the ‘corner of history’ refers to Spanish modern 
history and the loss of its former status relegating the country to a perceived 
less influential and less recognised actor within the international system.  
On 16 March 2003 the US organised an emergency summit on Iraq in the 
Azores hosted by Portugal and attended by the UK and Spain. This meeting 
represented the clearest demonstration of Aznar’s complete and unconditional 
support for the US policy towards Iraq and the complete departure from 
previous Spanish foreign policy focus.52 This, however, had already become 
rather obvious in the Spanish policy towards Iraq and the borrowing of 
arguments from the US rhetoric and again manifested in the Statement on 
Iraq released following the summit.53
 
 By now there was no doubt that Spain 
would be pursuing an active role in the forthcoming military intervention of 
Iraq. 
However, despite the bellicose nature of the Government’s rhetoric, domestic 
constraints proved too much for Aznar. As the US-led invasion loomed, Aznar 
was forced to explain the nature of the Government’s commitment to a now 
imminent military intervention of Iraq in humanitarian terms. Thus, he stated 
that ‘…any [Spanish] military presence, if necessary, will be temporary and 
directed towards promoting security and the destruction of the weapons of 
mass destruction as well as delivering humanitarian aid…’ following these 
comments with the Government’s commitment to solving the Middle East 
                                                 
49 Congreso de los Diputados, Diario De Sesiones Del Congreso De Los Diputados, Pleno Y 
Diputación Permanente, VII Legislatura, Número 231, Sesion Plenaria Número 212 
Celebrada El Miércoles, 5 De Marzo De 2003, 5 March 2003, available at: 
<www.congreso.es>.  
50 Ibid., p. 11751. 
51 This interpretation was confirmed in an Interview with the Defence Spokesperson in 
Parliament for the PSOE, 22 July 2008. 
52 Aznar’s attendance to this summit resulted in a photo of him with Bush and Blair, a photo 
that has become a joke in Spain for Aznar’s critics to talk about how desperate Aznar was to be 
perceived as a close friend and ally of Bush’s. 





conflict and the creation of an independent, democratic Palestine,54 as if 
suggesting it was part of a broader foreign policy agenda, and appealing 
(unsuccessfully) to Spain’s traditional pro-Palestinian stance. Furthermore, 
Trillo argued in his memoirs55 that the Government had internally decided to 
make a mere humanitarian contribution if a new resolution at the Security 
Council was not signed, which seems ironic given that the Government had 
been arguing at least since February 2003 that a new UNSC resolution would 
not be legally essential but politically desirable.56
 
 
In the end, Spain contributed in two different ways. First, the Spanish 
Government gave authorisation for the US to use its air space and bases as 
part of the bilateral agreement on defence. The Spanish Minister of Defence, 
Trillo, admitted on 19 February that the US had requested authorisation to use 
the Spanish bases of Rota and Morón for operations in Iraq, to which the 
Government had responded favourably.57 But interestingly he argued that the 
authorisation of this logistical support was for the ‘…United Nations 
authorised operations for Enduring Freedom, Resolution 1373…’ and as part 
of surveillance operations Northern and Southern Watch.58 UNSC resolution 
1373 was adopted on 28 September 2001 as a result of the events of 9/11 and 
was aimed at combating terrorism. It is based on Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter and reminded members that ‘…every State has the duty to refrain 
from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in 
another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed 
towards the commission of such acts…’,59
 
 a Resolution that was also used at 
times to legitimise military action in Afghanistan. 
Northern and Southern Watch were operations carried out in no-fly zones 
targeting Iraqi aircraft from 1991 to protect groups as part of Operation 
Provide Comfort (which officially ended in 1996) although Northern Watch 
and Southern Watch continued until 2003.60
                                                 
54 Congreso de los Diputados, Pleno Y Diputación Permanente Año 2003 VII Legislatura 
Número 227 Celebrada El Martes, 18 De Marzo De 2003, 18 March 2003, available at: 
<www.congreso.es>,  pp. 12056-12057. 
 Trillo suggested that Resolution 
1373 provided legal cover for Operation Enduring Freedom and Operations 
55 F. Trillo, Memoria De Entreguerras: Mis Años En El Ministerio De Defensa (2000-2004), 
1 ed. Barcelona: Planeta, 2005. 
56 See for example Anuarios de Política Exterior, ‘Entrevista De La Ministra De Asuntos 
Exteriores, Ana Palacio Vallelersundi, En El Diario 'El Pais'’ p. 379. 
57 See for example C. Navajas’ analysis of the PP’s defence policy in Government in which he 
confirmed that the Spanish Government had guaranteed the unconditional use of Spanish 
bases to the US as far back as January 2003 (with or without Security Council authorisation 
for an intervention) and ‘…in fact the US had been using these bases since September 2002’ 
for operations in Iraq (N. Zubeldia, ‘The Spanish Defense Policy in Regression’ op.cit, p. 108). 
58 Congreso de los Diputados, Pleno Y Diputación Permanente Año 2003 VII Legislatura 
Número 228. Sesión Plenaria Número 219 Celebrada El Miércoles, 19 De Febrero De 2003, 
19 February 2003 [cited 1 June 2009]; available at: <www.congreso.es>, p. 11618; see also 
Consejo de Ministros, Rueda De Prensa, Presidencia del Gobierno, 21 March 2003, available 
at: <www.la-mocloa.es>.  
59 United Nations, Resolution 1373, 28 September 2001, available at: <www.un.org>.  
60 A. Prados, ‘CRS Report for Congress. Iraq Crisis: US and Allied Forces’ Foreign Affairs and 
National Defense, Congressional Research Service. The Library of Congress, 1998; N. 
Serafino, ‘CRS Issue Brief for Congress. Peacekeeping: Issues of US Military Involvement’ 
Defense Foreign Affairs, and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service, The Library of 
Congress, 2003. 
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Northern Watch and Southern Watch, a statement that is at best questionable 
since these operations started prior to the actual resolution. This logistical 
support, which was maintained as Operation Iraqi Freedom was launched, 
was not subject to parliamentary debate or vote because the Government had 
invoked the Spain-US bilateral defence agreement. In fact the Government 
could argue that it was legally required to provide support by the very nature 
of the treaty. Thus, the Spanish government was able to provide logistical 
support for combat operations using when needed the above legal arguments. 
But why go to such length to argue the legality of the operation if the 
Government could simply resort to this bilateral agreement? Because, 
according to international law, Article 53 of the Vienna Convention and Article 
103 of the UN Charter in particular state that international law and the UN 
Charter take precedence over bilateral agreements and other treaties when a 
conflict between the two exists.61
 
 
Second, Spain’s contribution to Operation Iraqi Freedom was composed of a 
naval hospital ship with the pertinent logistical support (an amphibious 
assault vessel, a frigate and a tanker) that included engineers and nuclear and 
biological defence experts from the Army for deactivation of mines, 
reconnaissance and decontamination. In total, the contingent was composed 
of up to 900 troops.62 In addition, the Government committed six F-18 planes 
and one Hercules for the defence of Turkey (under NATO)63 bringing the total 
to 1,100 troops.64 This contribution was decided, argued Aznar, on the 
morning of 18 March and he stated that ‘…Spain will not participate in attack 
missions or [missions] of an offensive character…there will not be Spanish 
combat troops...The Government understands that Spain has an obligation of 
solidarity with those countries of whom it is an ally, and with whom [Spain] 
shares the same position of defence of international legality’.65
                                                 
61 I am very grateful to Raquel Regueiro Dubra for her advice on this issue and for providing 
me with the information that I needed to clarify this point. 
 This was 
certainly an interesting spin, and a much more deflated rhetoric. 
62 Navajas argued that the Ministry of Defence supported the Government’s decision to 
participate in Iraq and had even developed various plans for a Spanish contingent of combat 
troops in an unilateral US attack; see in N. Zubeldia, ‘The Spanish Defense Policy in 
Regression’, op. cit. However, Trillo denied this in his memoirs, although he admitted some 
preparations some paragraphs later as well as the pressure that public opinion opposition 
exerted on the Government Trillo, op. cit., pp.  252-53. 
63 Interestingly the El Pais newspaper reported in early March that the Spanish Government 
had announced to NATO that it was willing to make an unspecified military contribution to 
the defence of Turkey. Perhaps they thought the situation would end up in a similar way to 
Kosovo – no UN authorisation but NATO legitimacy. 
64 Congreso de los Diputados, Pleno Y Diputación Permanente Año 2003 VII Legislatura 
Número 227 Celebrada El Martes, 18 De Marzo De 2003 pp. 12059; Consejo de Ministros, 
Rueda De Prensa, Navajas Zubeldia, ‘The Spanish Defense Policy in Regression’ p. 109. 
65 Congreso de los Diputados, Pleno Y Diputación Permanente Año 2003 VII Legislatura 
Número 227 Celebrada El Martes, 18 De Marzo De 2003 p. 12058. In fact, the cost of the 
contingent was charged to the budget section allocated for peace missions (concepto 228), 
despite the fact that the peaceful nature of the mission was more than questionable. Also, 
interestingly budget constraints might have been another reason why, coupled with mounting 
opposition, the Government was forced to consider only a humanitarian contribution. In fact, 
during the press conference following the Consejo de Ministros on 21 March 2002 Trillo 
anticipated that, given the agreed reductions in other operations, the cost of the contribution 





Following the Government’s decision to send troops to Iraq as part of the 
Coalition of the Willing, the PSOE made Spanish security and foreign policy a 
political priority. The 2004 electoral program clearly reflected this shift. While 
all previous programs had featured Spain’s defence and security policies 
towards the end of the document, the 2004 program featured a lengthier 
section at the start. With the next Spanish general election on the horizon, the 
PSOE campaigned in 2003 and 2004 with a clear objective to make a radical 
and quick change in the current direction of Spanish foreign policy adopted by 
the Aznar government, and the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq if, by 




On 14 March 2004, three days after the worst terrorist attack on Spanish 
soil,67 the PSOE, headed by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, won the election, 
and Aznar’s political career officially ended, as he had promised he would step 
down after eight years in government. Shortly after, on 18 April 2004, the new 
President of the Spanish Government announced the withdrawal of Spanish 
troops from Iraq with an immediate effect. While the announcement came as 
no surprise, Zapatero’s decision not to wait until 30 June as had been 
promised,68 and not to even wait until the first Consejo de Ministros took 
place the following day, attracted various degrees of criticism even among 
supporters of the decision.69
 
 
It is very possible that this change responded more to populism despite the 
fact that it was consistent with the PSOE’s position, maintained from the very 
beginning of the crisis. This argument is somewhat reinforced by public 
opinion surveys. A CIS report from March 2004 reported that only 3.9% of 
Spaniards surveyed felt the Iraq war70
                                                                                                                                            
year with a similar expenditure and ‘…even if possible, lower’ which is a significant prediction 
to make that arguably responded to opposition to the war.  
 constituted one of Spain’s main 
problems and only 1.7% responded that the Iraq war affected them personally, 
but 35.4% said that the Iraq war was the international issue that worried them 
66 Which meant that the US would have had to reduce its role significantly and ceased to have 
control over the operation, which would have been completely assumed by UN troops and 
command, a highly unlikely prospect especially given the way the conflict was evolving. 
67 The attack on 11 March 2004 was carried out by Islamist fundamentalists who were also 
Spanish residents, mainly of Moroccan origin. The bombings were often publicly linked to the 
presence of Spanish troops in Iraq and were viewed as a direct consequence, although 
politically there was caution about this debate. See for example Congreso de los Diputados, 
Pleno Y Diputación Permanente Año 2004 VIII Legislatura Número 4. Sesión Plenaria 
Número 4 Celebrada El Martes, 27 De Abril De 2004, 27 April 2004, available at: 
<www.congreso.es>.  
68 Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), Programa Electoral (2004). 
69 Congreso de los Diputados, Pleno Y Diputación Permanente Año 2004 VIII Legislatura 
Número 4. Sesión Plenaria Número 4 Celebrada El Martes, 27 De Abril De 2004; Celestino 
del Arenal, ‘La Retirada De Las Tropas De Irak Y La Necesidad De Una Nueva Política 
Exterior’ ARI No. 82/2004, Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, 2004; Carlos Ruiz Miguel, ‘La 
Retirada Española De Irak: Significado Y Consequencias’ ARI No. 81/2004, Madrid: Real 
Instituto Elcano, 2004. 
70 Note that the CIS explicitly used the term ‘the Iraq war’ in its questions despite the fact that 
the war itself ended in May 2003. The same applies for the survey carried out by the Real 
Instituto Elcano. This use of language, arguably, might have affected responses, and it is 
interesting to note that it is how the conflict was still being perceived in Spain. 
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most.71 But even more relevant was the survey carried out by the Real 
Instituto Elcano in which 62% of Spaniards consulted still thought ‘there were 
no sound reasons’ to overthrow Saddam’s regime (versus 30% who did); and 
40% of Spaniards wanted troops to be withdrawn from Iraq versus 39% who 
thought that troops should stay if they were part of a UN-led multinational 
force and 20% who thought troops should stay.72
 
 In light of these results, 
Zapatero’s decision to act before the timeline he had proposed prior to the 
election can arguably be considered a populist initiative. 
But what remained unambiguous was that in the months leading up to, and 
following the Iraq crisis, it became very clear that the factors that appeared to 
influence the different positions of political actors in Spain were different, and 
those that constituted the narratives of Aznar’s government were as much a 
response to the external environment, as ideological factors driving 
perceptions of the role Spain was to play internationally and constraints of a 
domestic political and social environment heavily opposed to the military 




Iraq illustrated the superficiality with which military intervention can be 
viewed by politicians and policy-makers alike, and this was no different with 
Spain. The PP’s claims that its involvement in Iraq was humanitarian are a 
fallacy. If anything, it was nothing more than the reflection of the progressive 
militarisation of aid and foreign policy. The tasks assigned to the armed forces 
followed a clear political agenda, and lacked the neutrality and impartiality 
that characterises humanitarian action.73
 
 The real motives behind Aznar’s 
position of support for military intervention in Iraq can be interpreted 
through various lenses, but the factors that appeared to influence his decision 
were consistent in government rhetoric and narratives and responded as 
much to the external environment as to the domestic and ideological context.  
The national interest has been argued by various commentators as being 
behind Aznar’s ‘strategic’ decisions, and it is very probable that the 
Government perceived the benefits of participation to be in the national 
interest. A national interest defined in rather subjective terms it seemed, 
especially since Spain’s position did more damage than good for the image of 
the country in Europe. International legality and legitimacy were also deemed 
important, which explains the Government’s emphasis in convincing 
Spaniards that it was the framework in which the Coalition of the Willing was 
acting. This could be interpreted as a reflection of both a new normative 
framework and a recognition of states’ responsibilities acting in a managed 
anarchical international system. But it can be concluded that security and 
foreign policies, political narratives and public political discourse in Spain 
                                                 
71 Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Barómetro De Marzo. Estudio No. 2,558, 2004, 
available at: <www.cis.es>.  
72 Real Instituto Elcano, The Fifth Wave of the Brie (February 2004), available at: 
<http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CO
NTEXT=/Elcano_in/Barometer/Barometer05>.  
73 This does not mean that the soldiers involved did not have the welfare of civilians in mind 




show that different governments’ perceptions of the world, and responses to 
particular events or crises, are a result of a process of social construction 
which is influenced by the leader’s personal background, interpretations of 
historical memory, emotions, ideology, ideas and interpretations of the 
domestic and the international context.  
 
Regardless of its motives, the Spanish government seemed determined in 
supporting the US policy. Where it could, it did indeed contribute to combat 
operations by lending its air space and air bases to US planes carrying out the 
attack within the framework of the bilateral defence agreement, with legal 
implications which the Government tried to address by maintaining the 
rhetoric around a perceived or constructed legality of the operation. This 
happened even in the weeks before Operation Iraqi Freedom was launched. 
But when it came to a more physical (and visible) presence of Spanish troops, 
the Government could not avoid the public debates and political scrutiny of 
the opposition and was forced to opt for a symbolic ‘humanitarian’ 
contribution. 
 
An analysis of the rhetoric and narratives used in the debates surrounding the 
decision to contribute Spanish troops indicates that those factors that 
appeared more influential to the Aznar government’s support of the US policy 
had more to do with the Government’s perception of the international system 
and with a political opportunism for domestic purposes, based on ideological 
factors and Aznar’s vision for Spain. Ultimately, it was Aznar’s war, and one 
that led him to break the domestic and European consensus in favour of an 
unconditional support for the US position, the benefits of which were not 
clearer then than they are now. 
